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To counter the growing number of teenagers infected with
the HIV virus, almost four hundred public junior high and high
schools nationwide, including those in New York, Washington,
D.C., and Philadelphia, have begun distributing condoms to
students.' When the New York City public school system began
its program in 1991, it neither required prior parental consent
nor gave concerned parents a chance to "opt out."2 In Alfonso v
Fernandez, a New York state appellate court ruled that such a
program, by entirely bypassing parents, violated the parents'
right to control the upbringing of their children.' The court re-
marked that it would allow distribution if New York permitted
parents to opt out of the program,4 but the court's opinion did
not address the more stringent alternative of requiring prior
parental consent. Since then, in Curtis v School Committee of
Falmouth, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that
parental involvement in such programs is not constitutionally
required.5 Hence, it is unclear whether parental involvement in
public-school condom-distribution programs is necessary, and if
so, what form such involvement should take. This Comment
argues that parental involvement is constitutionally mandated,
and, further, that condom-distribution programs requiring prior
parental consent are the only such programs adequately protec-
tive of parental rights to withstand constitutional scrutiny.
The Supreme Court has long recognized that, under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,' parents have a
t BA. 1993, Duke University; J.D. Candidate 1996, The University of Chicago.
' See Douglas J. Besharov, Life is Not Just a Bowl of Condoms, Wash Post Cl, C4
(May 1, 1994) (Washington, DC); Alfonso v Fernandez, 195 AD2d 46, 606 NYS2d 259, 261
(1993) (New York); Parents United for Better Schools, Inc. v School Dist. of Philadelphia
Bd of Educ., 166 Pa Commw 462, 646 A2d 689, 690 (1994) (Philadelphia).
2 Both courts and schools use "opt out" as a verb to refer to the ability of a parent to
excuse his or her child from an undesirable school program, and "opt-out provisions" to
refer to excusal provisions.
3 195 AD2d 46, 606 NYS2d 259, 265 (1993).
Id at 267.
420 Mass 749, 652 NE2d 580, 586 (1995), cert denied, 116 S Ct 753 (1996).
"No State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due pro-
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constitutionally protected liberty interest in directing their
children's upbringing and education.7 Like other recognized
liberty interests, however, this parental right is not absolute.'
But because the right is grounded in the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment and considered fundamental, limita-
tions of parental liberty should be strictly scrutinized.9 Hence, a
state regulation should be allowed to limit parents' rights only if
the infringement is both necessary and narrowly tailored to pro-
mote a compelling government interest.'0
When schools distribute condoms, some parents feel their
liberty interests are burdened. These parents sense an invasion
because they feel that schools-to which they are obligated by
law to send their children-implicitly condone sexual activity by
providing children with the means to engage in it more safely.
While parents share control over a child's education and upbring-
ing with the state, some parents may feel that the state's encour-
agement of an activity that they oppose crosses the line between
supplementing parental guidance and supplanting it. Hence,
condom-distribution programs in schools, and their attendant
invasion of the parental liberty interest, should be strictly scruti-
cess of law .... " US Const, Amend XIV, § 1.
7 The Court has interpreted the right of parents to direct the rearing of their chil-
dren to come under the constitutional auspices of the fundamental right to privacy guar-
anteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Carey v Population Services International, 431
US 678, 684-85 (1977). Earlier cases, while finding that parents had a "liberty interest" in
the raising of their children protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, did not couch this
interest in the terms of a fundamental right to privacy. See Meyer v Nebraska, 262 US
390, 400 (1923) (The right of parents to direct the education of their children is "within
the liberty of the [Fourteenth] Amendment."); Pierce v Society of Sisters, 268 US 510, 534-
35 (1925) (A statute prohibiting private education "unreasonably interferes with the lib-
erty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under
their control."); Prince v Massachusetts, 321 US 158, 166 (1944) ("It is cardinal with us
that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary
function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor
hinder.").
' Prince, 321 US at 166 ("[Tlhe family itself is not beyond regulation in the public
interest.").
9 Ronald D. Rotunda and John E. Nowak, 2 Treatise on Constitutional Law: Sub-
stance and Procedure § 15.7 at 434-36 (West 2d ed 1992). Both equal protection and due
process analysis employ the strict scrutiny standard of review when regulations or classi-
fications affect the exercise of fundamental rights. See id § 15.4 at 401-02; Ronald D.
Rotunda and John E. Nowak, 3 Treatise on Constitutional Law: Substance and Procedure
§ 18.3 at 15-16 (West 2d ed 1992). Thus, this Comment often uses examples from the
equal protection context to illuminate its application in the due process context.
10 See, for example, Alfonso, 606 NYS2d at 265. See also Michael v Hertzler, 900 P2d
1144, 1145 (Wyo 1995) (holding that because parental rights are fundamental, statute
permitting grandparents to bring action to obtain rights visit to grandchildren requires
strict scrutiny).
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nized by the courts; that is, they should be upheld only when the
infringements are narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state
interest."
There is no legal dispute that preventing Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome ("AIDS")' is a compelling state interest,
and the provision of AIDS education seems both a necessary 3
and a narrowly tailored means of meeting that goal. The cases do
not settle, however, the issue of when condom-distribution pro-
grams, as opposed to educational programs, also meet these
criteria.
Because of the burden that such programs impose on those
parents who do not want the school to facilitate their children's
sexual activity, many feel that only programs granting parents
final authority over whether their children may obtain condoms
are acceptable. Moreover, the issue of parental involvement in
school condom programs is further complicated because different
forms of parental involvement can result in markedly disparate
outcomes, with concomitantly varying levels of intrusion on
parental rights. For example, opt-out provisions place the burden
on parents to act affirmatively to reclaim their legal authority
from the state in order to prevent their children from receiving
condoms at school. In contrast, prior consent requirements leave
this authority with the parents until they affirmatively delegate
it to school officials by authorizing their children's participation
in the condom-distribution program. In strict scrutiny terms,
these distinctions are relevant to whether a program is suffi-
ciently "narrowly tailored." As an increasing number of school
systems across the country contemplate condom-distribution
"' Rotunda and Nowak, 2 Treatise on Constitutional Law § 15.4 at 402 (cited in note
9). See also Reno v Flores, 507 US 292, 302 (1993) ("[Tlo infringe certain Tundamental'
liberty interests ... the infringement [must be] narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
state interest.") (citations omitted). Courts often apply strict scrutiny without explicitly so
stating. As a general rule, though, if a court is looking for a compelling state interest to
justify a government regulation, it is applying strict scrutiny. See Rotunda and Nowak, 3
Treatise on Constitutional Law § 18.3 at 15 (cited in note 9).
" The spread of AIDS has been the impetus for condom-distribution programs.
Historically, the prevention of teen pregnancy and venereal disease have justified sex
education courses and the provision of contraceptives to minors. Today, AIDS is also
mentioned as a justification. See, for example, Alfonso, 606 NYS2d at 263; Stephen
Buckley, Sex Education's Tough Question, Wash Post D1, D1, D3 (Feb 28, 1994). For the
traditional case for sex education in the public schools, see Fernand N. Dutile, Sex,
Schools and the Law 48-49 (Thomas 1986).
,3 See Ware v Valley Stream High School District, 75 NY2d 114, 551 NYS2d 167, 176
(1989) ("Education regarding the means by which AIDS is communicated is a powerful
weapon against the spread of the disease and clearly an essential component of our
nationwide struggle to combat it.").
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plans, 4 the question of what level of parental involvement-if
any-is required deserves careful attention.
This Comment analyzes whether school 5 condom-distribu-
tion programs should be subject to strict scrutiny, and if so, how
such programs should be structured to withstand this heightened
standard of review. Section I examines the general right of
parents to influence the upbringing and education of their chil-
dren and emphasizes its grounding in the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Section II demonstrates why con-
dom distribution at school presents a unique problem unresolved
by current law. It addresses the Alfonso and Curtis decisions,
which not only contradict each other but also fail to address the
full range of legal issues involved in school distribution pro-
grams. This Section also compares such programs to sex educa-
tion courses and nonschool condom-distribution programs. Al-
though precedent from these contexts does not address all the
issues that arise when schools distribute condoms to students, it
nonetheless illuminates the scope of the parental liberty interest.
Finally, Section III argues that public-school condom-distribution
programs should be reviewed under a standard of strict scrutiny
and concludes that only those programs that require prior paren-
tal consent should be constitutionally permissible.
I. THE RIGHT OF PARENTS TO INFLUENCE THE UPBRINGING AND
EDUCATION OF THEIR CHILDREN
A. The Origins of the Parental Liberty Interest
In a trilogy of cases in the 1920s, the Supreme Court estab-
lished that parents have a constitutionally protected liberty inter-
est in directing their children's upbringing and education. 6 In
all three cases, the Court explicitly grounded this liberty in the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'7 The three
cases also suggest that, although it is not absolute, the parental
liberty interest they establish is at least immune from arbitrary
and unreasonable interference. 8
See Buckley, Sex Education's Tough Question, Wash Post at D7 (cited in note 12);
Chastity Pratt, Superintendent Balks at Condom Distribution Idea, Wash Post Md Weekly
1, 7 (July 14, 1994).
Throughout this Comment, "school' refers only to public schools.
16 See Meyer v Nebraska, 262 US 390 (1923); Pierce v Society of Sisters, 268 US 510
(1925); Farrington v Tokushige, 273 US 284 (1927).
'7 Meyer, 262 US at 399-400; Pierce, 268 US at 534-35; Farrington, 273 US at 298-99.
18 Meyer, 262 US at 399-400 ("[T]his liberty may not be interfered with... by legisla-
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In Meyer v Nebraska, the first of the trilogy, a schoolteacher
challenged his conviction for teaching German to a ten-year-old
boy in violation of a statute that prohibited teaching foreign
languages to students before the eighth grade.19 The Court held
that the statute "unreasonably infringe[d] the liberty
guaranteed... by the Fourteenth Amendment" by interfering
with both the teacher's right to teach German and, more impor-
tantly, the boy's parents' right to hire a teacher to do so.2 ° In
reaching this conclusion, the Court recognized that the exact
scope of the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment was
undefined, but listed a number of rights included in the Amend-
ment:
Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily
restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to
engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire
useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long rec-
ognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men."'
Thus, in finding the Nebraska law unconstitutional, the Court
first recognized parents' Fourteenth Amendment right to influ-
ence and direct their children's upbringing and education.
Two years later, in Pierce v Society of Sisters,22 the Court
made an even stronger statement about the liberty interest it
recognized in Meyer. The Pierce Court held unconstitutional an
Oregon law that mandated that all children attend public school,
thereby preventing parents from sending their children to private
or parochial schools.' Specifically referring to the Meyer doc-
trine, the Court found it "entirely plain that the [Oregon
law] ... unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children
tive action which is arbitrary or without reasonable relation to some purpose within the
competency of the State to effect."); Pierce, 268 US at 535 ("[R]ights guaranteed by the
Constitution may not be abridged by legislation which has no reasonable relation to some
purpose within the competency of the State."); Farrington, 273 US at 298 ("The [ ] parent
has the right to direct the education of his own child without unreasonable restrictions.").
" 262 US 390, 396-97 (1923).
'o Id at 399, 402.
21 Id at 399.
- 268 US 510 (1925).
2 Id at 536.
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under their control."24 The Court then addressed the balance of
interests between parents and the state in influencing child de-
velopment, stating that "[tihe child is not the mere creature of
the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the
right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him
for additional obligations.""
In Farrington v Tokushige, the last of the 1920s trilogy, the
Court invalidated a Hawaiian statute that regulated almost ev-
ery aspect of private schooling.26 In particular, the statute effec-
tively banned private after-school classes that were taught in
Japanese and the subject matter of which included, among other
things, Japanese language and culture.' Citing Meyer and
Pierce, the Court held that the law unreasonably interfered with
the parents' ability to direct and control the upbringing of their
children by denying them the opportunity to teach their children
Japanese.28
These three cases, all involving parental challenges to state
attempts to monopolize education, establish that the state must
allow parents some control to augment and direct their children's
education.2 ' They do not, however, address what steps parents
can take to prevent the state from encroaching on the parental
domain by conducting programs that disrupt educational func-
tions-teaching about religion and sexuality, for exam-
ple-traditionally left to the family.
In Wisconsin v Yoder,"° the Supreme Court began to grapple
with whether parents may object to state educational programs
because they undermine traditionally parent-initiated education.
In that case, Amish parents objected to a statute making school
attendance mandatory until age sixteen on the grounds that it
violated their First Amendment right to the free exercise of reli-
gion. The Amish parents argued that because mandatory atten-
dance "takes [children] away from their community, physically
and emotionally, during the crucial and formative adolescent
period of life,"3 it "was contrary to the Amish religion and way
2 Id at 534-35.
2 Id at 535.
26 273 US 284, 298-99 (1927).
2 Id at 298.
2 Id at 298-99.
' For an overview of the scope of judicially recognized parental rights to influence
the public school education of their children, see generally Ralph D. Mawdsley, Parental
Rights and Public Education, 59 Educ L Rptr 271 (1990).
'o 406 US 205 (1972).
31 Id at 211.
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of life," and thereby jeopardized both their children's salvation
and their own." The Court agreed, recognizing that the statute
interfered with the free exercise of the Amish religion."
Although it ruled on free exercise grounds, the Yoder Court
also reaffirmed the importance of parental liberty:
IT]he history and culture of Western civilization reflect a
strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and
upbringing of their children. This primary role of the par-
ents in the upbringing of their children is now established
beyond debate as an enduring American tradition.34
In reinforcing the pro-parents' rights stance undertaken in
Pierce, the Court noted that the "additional obligations" for which
the Pierce Court held parents must prepare their children "must
be read to include the inculcation of moral standards, religious
beliefs, and elements of good citizenship."35
At a minimum, Yoder suggests that parents may object to
state educational activities that directly undermine parent-initi-
ated religious education. Unfortunately, Yoder does not illumi-
nate when parents may object to state programs that threaten
nonreligious parental education initiatives. Although the Court
made it clear that parents may lodge such objections under the
First Amendment only when they are religiously based,"6 noth-
ing in its decision states that parents could not ground nonreli-
gious objections to state programs in other parts of the Constitu-
tion. Moreover, the Yoder Court's analysis of Pierce is somewhat
misleading. For example, it read into Pierce the specific right to
direct the religious upbringing of one's child; then, it recast that
right as grounded in the Free Exercise Clause. It seems, howev-
er, to have left untouched Pierce's more general holding that
parents enjoy the right to direct the education and upbringing of
their children as part of the substantive due process guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Supreme Court has been quite clear, however, that the
state's own interests also matter, and in some cases justify the
limitation of certain parental prerogatives, whether religiously
grounded or not. In Prince v Massachusetts, the Court first artic-
2 Id at 209.
" Id at 219.
3 Id at 232.
" Id at 233.
36 Id at 215.
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ulated such a limitation when it upheld a state child-labor law
against a hybrid free exercise-parental liberty challenge."7 In
that case, the guardian of a nine-year-old girl objected to a law
that prevented the girl from selling magazines for the Jehovah's
Witnesses. The guardian argued that the law prevented her from
raising the child as she desired, including teaching the child the
practices of her religion, and thus violated both her free exercise
right and her parental liberty interest. 8
The Prince Court rejected this argument, using the same
analysis for both types of rights. It held that:
[N]either rights of religion nor rights of parenthood are be-
yond limitation. Acting to guard the general interest in
youth's well being, the state as parens patriae may restrict
the parent's control by requiring school attendance, regulat-
ing or prohibiting the child's labor, and in many other
ways.
39
In reaching this conclusion, the Court balanced the state's inter-
est in protecting children from employment against the rights of
parents to exercise their religion and to raise their children ac-
cordingly." In giving precedence to the state's interest, Prince
clearly established that the state may regulate certain parental
activities, regardless of whether parents claim protection under
the Fourteenth Amendment parental liberty interest or the First
Amendment right to the free exercise of religion.
Although Prince limits the parental liberty interest recog-
nized in Pierce, Meyer, Farrington, and Yoder, today's parents
undeniably continue to enjoy a substantial liberty interest in
directing their children's upbringing and education. This interest
limits certain state educational activities, such as those depriving
parents' choice concerning their children's educational experienc-
es. The state, however, enjoys similar interests that can limit
parental activity in certain situations, and the tension between
the competing interests of the parents and the state often gives
rise to litigation.
321 US 158, 170 (1944).
's Id at 164.
Id at 166 (citations omitted).
40 Id at 168-70.
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B. The Modern Contours of the Parental Liberty Interest
Unfortunately, the precise scope of the parental liberty inter-
est in today's world of more activist government remains unclear.
Traditionally, the law has established certain boundaries to limit
both the state and parents. The state could not completely de-
prive parents of the ability to shape their children's education;4
nor could parents completely exclude the state from their
children's education. As the state begins to provide more of the
guidance traditionally supplied by parents, however, new bound-
aries will have to be established between the rights of parents
and the powers of the state. The controversy surrounding condom
distribution in the schools illustrates the tension and uncertainty
one encounters at the edges of these boundaries.
Existing case law does little to define these boundaries. The
early cases establishing the parental liberty interest-Pierce,
Meyer, and Farrington-date from a period when the Court used
a "reasonable relation" test to evaluate legislation under the
doctrine of substantive due process.' Subsequent cases refining
the scope of parental liberty-Prince and Yoder-mix parental
liberty claims with free exercise claims, subjecting both to the
heightened scrutiny applied to free exercise claims."
Most importantly, because the Court analyzed the claims in
Yoder under the First Amendment, it did not determine which of
the current standards of review-rational relation, intermediate
scrutiny, or strict scrutiny45-- would apply to a due pro-
4, See Meyer, 262 US at 400; Pierce, 268 US at 534-35; Farrington, 273 US at 298.
42 Yoder, 406 US at 234 (Amish children still required to attend school through junior
high); Care and Protection of Charles, 399 Mass 324, 504 NE2d 592, 598 (1987) (State
may require parents to obtain approval prior to home schooling their children.).
' Meyer, 262 US at 403 ("We are constrained to conclude that the statute as applied
is arbitrary and without reasonable relation to any end within the competency of the
State.") (emphasis added); Pierce, 268 US at 535 ("[Rlights guaranteed by the Constitution
may not be abridged by legislation which has no reasonable relation to some purpose
within the competency of the State.") (emphasis added); Farrington, 273 US at 298
(speaking of "unreasonable restrictions"). For a discussion of these cases, see Rotunda and
Nowak, 2 Treatise on Constitutional Law § 15.3 at 389 (cited in note 9).
" Prince, 321 US at 170 (finding a child labor law "necessary to accomplish its legiti-
mate objectives") (emphasis added); Yoder, 406 US at 215 ("[O~nly those interests of the
highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free
exercise of religion."). Whether heightened scrutiny still applies to neutral and generally
applicable laws in the free exercise context remains unclear. See Employment Division v
Smith, 494 US 872, 881-82 (1990) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause alone does not
bar "the application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated ac-
tion"). But see Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub L No 103-141, 107 Stat
1488, codified at 42 USC § 2000bb (1994) (attempting to reinstate Yoder's application of
strict scrutiny to neutral, generally applicable laws).
" For a general discussion of the standards of review used in the due process and
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cess-based parental liberty claim. This is especially significant
because Yoder is the modern case most squarely addressing the
liberty interest in rearing one's child; hence the Court has never
directly resolved which standard of review would apply to a claim
grounded in that interest. By continually acknowledging the
importance of parental control and guidance,46 and by referring
to it as part of the right to privacy protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment,47 however, the Court suggests that strict scrutiny
is the appropriate standard.
This suggestion stems from the Court's recognition of the
right to privacy as a "fundamental" right. Such rights include not
only most of those enumerated in the first eight amendments of
the Bill of Rights,4" but also a narrow list of nonenumerated
rights that the Court has chosen to protect even though the Con-
stitution itself does not mention them.49 To limit this list, the
equal protection contexts, see Rotunda and Nowak, 3 Treatise on Constitutional Law §
18.3 at 12-41 (cited in note 9).
"' See, for example, H.L. v Matheson, 450 US 398, 410 (1981) ("We have recognized
that parents have an important 'guiding role' to play in the upbringing of their chil-
dren, ... which presumptively includes counseling them on important decisions.") (cita-
tions omitted); Quilloin v Walcott, 434 US 246, 255 (1978) ("We have recognized on
numerous occasions that the relationship between parent and child is constitutionally
protected.") (citations omitted); Ginsberg v New York, 390 US 629, 639 (1968)
("[C]onstitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the parents' claim to
authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the
structure of our society.").
' See, for example, Planned Parenthood v Casey, 505 US 833, 851 (1992) ("Our law
affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to ... family relationships,
child rearing, and education.... These matters, involving the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autono-
my, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.") (citations omit-
ted); Bellotti v Baird, 443 US 622, 637, 639 n 18 (1979) (plurality opinion) (exploring the
"guiding role of parents in the upbringing of their children" and noting that "Pierce, Yoder
[and] Prince ... all have contributed to a line of decisions suggesting the existence of a
constitutional parental right against undue, adverse interference by the State"); Roe v
Wade, 410 US 113, 152-53 (1973) (noting that only personal rights deemed "fundamental"
or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" are included in the right of privacy and
stating that this right extends to family relationships and child rearing and education);
Moore v City of East Cleveland, 431 US 494, 499 (1977) (explaining that Meyer, Pierce,
and their progeny establish a "private realm of family life" that is one of the "liberties
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment").
" See Rotunda and Nowak, 2 Treatise on Constitutional Law § 15.6 at 418-27 (cited
in note 9); Casey, 505 US at 847 ("The most familiar of the substantive liberties protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment are those recognized by the Bill of Rights.").
" See Casey, 505 US at 847-49 (noting that the Bill of Rights does not mark "the
outer limits of the substantive sphere of liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
tects"); Bowers v Hardwick, 478 US 186, 191 (1986) (noting that Meyer, Prince, and Pierce
recognized fundamental "rights that have little or no textual support in the constitutional
language").
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Court requires that a nonenumerated right be not only "implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty," but also one "traditionally
protected by our society" before recognizing it as fundamental."
Because these are malleable concepts, though, the Court is un-
derstandably reluctant to find that a given right meets these
standards.5
Once the Court deems a right to be fundamental, however, it
requires that state regulations infringing that right withstand
strict scrutiny.52 Such regulations must therefore serve a com-
pelling state interest and be narrowly tailored to meet that inter-
est.53 When the Court refers to the parental liberty interest as
part of the recognized ftmdamental right to privacy, it thus im-
plicitly casts parental liberty as a fundamental right.54 By so
doing, the Court implies (though it has never held) that infringe-
ments on the parental liberty interest must withstand strict
scrutiny.
Although lower federal and state courts agree that the pa-
rental liberty interest is fundamental and that infringements of
it merit strict scrutiny, these courts do not automatically cast all
parental activities as fundamental. Hence, courts do not apply
strict scrutiny to every regulation that affects parenting, but
rather only to state regulations that impede specific parental
activities.
' Michael H. v Gerald D., 491 US 110, 122 (1989) ("In an attempt to limit and guide
interpretation of the Clause, we have insisted not merely that the interest denominated
as a 'liberty' be 'fundamental,' ... but also that it be an interest traditionally protected by
our society."); Hardwick, 478 US at 192 (declining to recognize a "fundamental right [of]
homosexuals to engage in acts of consensual sodomy"); Roe, 410 US at 152 ("[O]nly
personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty' are included in [the Fourteenth Amendment's] guarantee of personal privacy.")
(citations omitted).
"' See Collins v City of Harker Heights, 503 US 115, 125 (1992) (discussing the re-
straint required when the Court analyzes a fundamental rights claim); Hardwick, 478 US
at 194 (declining "to take a more expansive view of [the Court's] authority to discover new
fundamental rights imbedded in the Due Process Clause"); Michael H., 491 US at 122
(noting that "the Court should be extremely reluctant to breathe still further substantive
content into the Due Process Clause").
52 Rotunda and Nowak, 2 Treatise on Constitutional Law § 15.7 at 427 (cited in note
9); Reno v Flores, 507 US 292, 302 (1993) (Government may not infringe upon a funda-
mental liberty interest "unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
state interest.") (citations omitted).
' Rotunda and Nowak, 2 Treatise on Constitutional Law § 15.4 at 402 (cited in note
9); Flores, 507 US at 302.
' Rotunda and Nowak, 2 Treatise on Constitutional Law § 15.7 at 436 (cited in note
9) ("[T]here is a fundamental right to privacy which... has been held to include rights to
freedom of choice... in child-rearing.").
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For example, several state courts have refused to use strict
scrutiny to analyze parental challenges to home schooling regula-
tions,55 thereby implicitly refusing to cast home schooling as a
"fundamental" parental right. Conversely, lower federal and state
courts have found that parental liberty interests could be consid-
ered fundamental in relation to the dispensation of birth control
to minors, implying that strict scrutiny should be applied where
such interests are burdened.5 This characterization suggests
that educating one's child about sexuality falls within the scope
of the protected liberty interest. The fact that the Supreme Court
itself has cast other activities relating to the creation and suste-
nance of families as fundamental57 buttresses the notion that
influencing one's child's sexual upbringing is a "fundamental"
right.
By any standard, then, neither the state nor a child's parents
can monopolize the child's education. The Fourteenth Amend-
ment guarantees to parents some ability to control their
children's upbringing. What remains unclear, however, is the
extent to which this liberty interest enables parents to protest
when the state does not overtly restrict parental choice but in-
See Charles, 504 NE2d at 599 (upholding prior approval requirement for home
schooling as not violating parents' "basic" right to educate children); State v DeLaBruere,
154 Vt 237, 577 A2d 254, 274 (1990) ("[Plarents' rights must give way to reasonable state
regulation.") (emphasis added); Murphy v Arkansas, 852 F2d 1039, 1043 (8th Cir 1988)
(finding in home schooling context "no persuasive arguments... that there is a funda-
mental right of parents to supervise their children's education .... Thus, again, strict
scrutiny cannot be invoked in this case."). See also Joseph P. Tocco, Note, Home Schooling
in Michigan: Is There a Fundamental Right to Teach Your Children at Home?, 71 U
Detroit Mercy L Rev 1053, 1060 n 55 (1994) (collecting cases).
' Doe v Irwin, 615 F2d 1162, 1167-69 (6th Cir 1980) (implying that had the court
found an interference with "plaintiffs' rights as parents," it would have applied strict
scrutiny by considering "whether a 'compelling state interest' was involved"); Curtis, 652
NE2d at 585-86 (agreeing that "parents possess a fundamental liberty interest" in child
rearing but holding that voluntary nature of condom distribution did not interfere with
this interest and hence inquiry into the state's interest was unnecessary); Alfonso, 606
NYS2d at 266-67 (holding school condom-distribution program unnecessary to meet
compelling state interest and hence a violation of parents' "rights to direct the upbringing
of their children"). While all three cases agree that strict scrutiny should be applied where
parental rights are impaired, they differ over exactly what constitutes an impairment.
" See Griswold v Connecticut, 381 US 479, 485 (1965) (contraception); Loving v
Virginia, 388 US 1, 12 (1967) (marriage); Moore, 431 US at 503 (living arrangements);
Yoder, 406 US at 233 (religious education of children). Together, these rights suggest a
"private realm of family life" protected from state interference. Moore, 431 US at 499.
Logically, if the state's ability to regulate individuals' decisions about entering and start-
ing families is limited, so too should its ability to regulate those activities that many
parents view as one of the major functions of the family-such as transmitting values and
attitudes about the aforementioned activities-be limited. See Stephen Gilles, On Educat-
ing Children: A Parentalist Manifesto, 63 U Chi L Rev (forthcoming 1996).
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stead supplements and supplants what has traditionally been
taught at home. The scope of the interest will likely turn on the
specific nature of what the parents are teaching at home. Some-
thing as important and private as sexuality, however, should
enable parents to invoke the parental liberty interest and its
attendant strict scrutiny.
II. SCHOOL CONDOM-DISTRIBUTION PROGRAMS AND THE
PARENTAL LIBERTY INTEREST
Currently, almost four hundred schools nationwide distribute
condoms to students. 8 Most programs exist in large cities,
where concerns over AIDS and teen pregnancy are highest.59
Despite sharing the same justification for dispensing condoms,
schools vary in the ways they have chosen to structure their
programs. 0 Schools that distribute condoms generally structure
their programs in one of three ways. They can distribute condoms
on demand without any parental involvement, distribute them
only to students whose parents previously consented to their
participation in the program, or distribute them to any student
except those whose parents have opted them out of the program.
Of schools currently distributing condoms, 39 percent do not
involve parents at all,61 21 percent require prior parental con-
sent, and 41 percent allow parents to opt their children out. 2 A
school district's choice regarding the extent of parental in-
Besharov, Life is Not Just a Bowl of Condoms, Wash Post at C4 (cited in note 1).
See Deborah Rissing Baurac, Teen sex: Condom distribution still a volatile policy
issue, Chi Trib Womanews 1 (Sept 20, 1992) (reporting that most of the schools that dis-
tribute condoms are in major urban areas such as New York, Chicago, Los Angeles,
Philadelphia, and Dallas); Eugene C. Bjorklun, Condom Distribution in the Public
Schools: Is Parental Consent Required?, 91 Educ L Rptr 11, 13 (1994) (noting that con-
dom-distribution programs "are almost entirely concentrated in the largest districts in the
nation in the Northeast and on the West Coast where there is more concern about
HIV/AIDS transmission than in other parts of the country").
® Bjorklun, 91 Educ L Rptr at 14-15 (cited in note 59).
61 Most such programs do require some adult participation, such as counseling from
the school's health clinic. In New York City's program, for example, trained health profes-
sionals dispensed the condoms in "health resource" rooms established for that purpose.
These professionals then counseled students requesting condoms on their proper use and
the consequences of their use or misuse. See Alfonso, 606 NYS2d at 261.
' Biorklun, 91 Educ L Rptr at 15 (cited in note 59). For a more complete description
of New York's program, which is representative of programs containing opt-out clauses,
see Karl J. Sanders, Comment, Kids and Condoms: Constitutional Challenges to the
Distribution of Condoms in Public Schools, 61 U Cin L Rev 1479, 1488-90 (1993).
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volvement, if any, will generally affect the number of students
who participate in its program.63
A. Alfonso and Curtis: Inconsistent and Incomplete
To date, only New York and Massachusetts courts have ad-
dressed the Fourteenth Amendment parental liberty implications
of schools distributing condoms." Not only do the two cases con-
tradict each other, but they fail to address adequately all the
issues raised by condom-distribution programs. The resulting
precedent leaves schools that desire to implement such programs
unsure about how to proceed.65
A group of New York parents was the first to contest in court
the distribution of condoms at their children's schools. In Alfonso,
concerned parents challenged the New York City public school
system's condom-distribution program, which neither required
prior parental consent nor gave concerned parents a chance to
opt out.66 The parents leveled three distinct charges. First, they
argued that the program violated their right to consent to the
provision of health services to their children.6 1 Second, the par-
ents maintained that the program violated their Fourteenth
Amendment parental-liberty interests.6 And finally, the parents
contended that the program infringed their First Amendment
free exercise rights.69 A New York appellate court readily agreed
Bjorklun, 91 Educ L Rptr at 15 (cited in note 59).
See Alfonso, 606 NYS2d at 265; Curtis, 652 NE2d at 584. Parents in Philadelphia
are currently litigating a similar, though distinct, issue. In Parents United for Better
Schools, Inc. v School Dist. of Philadelphia Bd of Educ., 166 Pa Commw 462, 646 A2d
689, 690-91 (1994), parents have argued that the distribution of condoms constitutes
"health services," and they are basing their challenge on the common law right of parents
to consent to the provision of medical services to their children.
' Commentators have likewise been silent. Although a score of articles analyzes
parental consent requirements in the contexts of sex education, abortion, and access to
birth control at nonschool clinics, only three discuss access to birth control devices in
public school clinics. See Marcia Mobilia Boumil, Dispensing Birth Control in Public
Schools: Do Parents Have a Right to Know?, 18 Seton Hall L Rev 356 (1988) (analyzing
whether parental involvement is necessary at all); Bjorklun, 91 Educ L Rptr 11 (cited in
note 59) (same); Sanders, Comment, 61 U Cin L Rev 1479 (cited in note 62) (same). Each
of these basically mimics the Alfonso court by analyzing the question whether parental
involvement is needed at all; only one examines how parental involvement should be
structured when such programs do attempt to involve parents. Sanders, Comment, 61 U
Cin L Rev at 1510-13 (cited in note 62) (generally endorsing opt-out plan as a wise deci-
sion on the part of administrators planning distribution programs).
' 606 NYS2d at 261.
6Id at 262.
6Id at 265.
6'Id at 267.
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with the health-service claim, 70 but disagreed with the free exer-
cise claim.7'
The court's analysis of the parental liberty claim is signifi-
cant for two reasons. First, by applying strict scrutiny to the
parents' claim, the Alfonso court implicitly recognized the
parents' liberty interest as fundamental. Only those state actions
that impede the exercise of a fundamental right must withstand
such scrutiny.72 By reviewing the program before it under this
standard, the Alfonso court suggested that New York's program
burdened such a right. The court thus demonstrated, although it
did not explicitly state, that it viewed parental guidance in the
sexual development of one's child to be a fundamental right.
Second, in applying strict scrutiny, the Alfonso court found
that the program at issue unjustifiably intruded upon the
parents' liberty interest.73 In so doing, the court distinguished
Doe v Irwin-an earlier case holding that condom distribution by
nonschool public clinics did not burden parental liberty inter-
ests"4-on the ground that the distribution programs in Doe
were not compulsory. 5 The Alfonso court explained that since
the Doe parents were not obligated by law to send their children
to public clinics, it was perfectly logical to find no compulsion in
that case. 5 In contrast, the New York parents were obligated by
law-that is, under state compulsion-to send their children to
school." The Alfonso court elaborated that merely forcing par-
ents to send their children into an environment where they
would be "exposed to ideas or a point of view with which they
disagree or find offensive" would not constitute an intrusion on
parental liberty. 8 Requiring parents to send their children into
"an environment where they had unrestricted access to free con-
traceptives" and where the school itself offered "the means for
70 Id at 265.
" Id at 267-68 (holding that mere exposure to disagreeable ideas does not burden
freedom of religion). See also Mozert v Hawkins County Board of Education, 827 F2d
1058, 1065 (6th Cir 1987) (holding that merely requiring children to read materials
offensive to their religion is not unconstitutional burden on free exercise).
' See Rotunda and Nowak, 2 Treatise on Constitutional Law § 15.7 at 434 (cited in
note 9).
"' Alfonso, 606 NYS2d at 266-67.
7- 615 F2d 1162, 1168 (6th Cir 1980). See Section II.B.2.
" Alfonso, 606 NYS2d at 266.
76 Id.
7 Id.
78 Id.
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students to engage in sexual activity at lower risk," however,
did.7
9
Having found an intrusion, the court then explored whether,
as required by strict scrutiny, that intrusion was justified as
necessary to further a compelling state interest.0 Because mi-
nors could obtain condoms in nonschool clinics without their
parents' knowledge, the court held that blocking parental involve-
ment in the school distribution plan was not necessary to meet
the state's compelling interest in preventing AIDS, and, there-
fore, the intrusion on parental rights was unwarranted.8 As a
result, the school would (at a minimum) have to implement an
opt-out provision to continue the program."
In contrast, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held
in Curtis that school condom-distribution programs in which
parents have no control over their children's participation are
constitutional." The court agreed with Alfonso that parents pos-
sess a fundamental Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in
directing their children's upbringing,' but, unlike Alfonso,
found that the condom-distribution program did not interfere
with this right.8" The Curtis court arrived at this finding by
reading into the parental liberty cases a requirement of "coer-
cion." The court thus created a new test, whereby "in order to
constitute a constitutional violation, the state action at issue
must be coercive or compulsory in nature. Coercion exists where
the governmental action is mandatory and provides no outlet for
the parents, such as where refusal to participate in a program
results in a sanction or expulsion."88 Because the students
availed themselves of the condoms completely voluntarily, the
Curtis court found no coercive burden on parental liberty inter-
ests.8 7 The court rejected the argument that the "compulsory
setting of public schools" created the necessary coercion, and
criticized the Alfonso court for applying this flawed reasoning.88
According to the Curtis court, then, because the program was
not coercive, it did not burden the parents' liberty interests, and
79 Id.
'o Id.
8, Id at 266-67.
82 Id.
83 652 NE2d at 585.
'4 Id.
Id.
6 Id at 586.
Id.
82 Id.
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hence required no justification whatsoever."9 Therefore, the
court held the program, despite its lack of parental control or
input, to be constitutional.90
With Alfonso and Curtis as the only relevant precedent, it is
an open question whether condom-distribution programs must
involve parents at all. Moreover, the only court to require paren-
tal involvement in school condom-distribution programs did not
specify how this involvement should be structured: the Alfonso
court mentioned opt-out provisions but was silent about parental
consent requirements.9 Hence, whether opt-out provisions,
standing alone, are constitutional remains unsettled. Commenta-
tors and scholars have likewise been silent about whether the
two modes of parental involvement have different constitutional
implications.
B. Parents' Rights in Other Contexts
Although only two courts have considered the parental liber-
ty interest in the context of public school condom-distribution
programs, analogous lines of precedent-specifically parental
challenges to sex education courses and the distribution of con-
doms outside of school-help illuminate its basis and scope.2
Id ("[M]ere exposure to programs offered at school does not amount to unconstitu-
tional interference with parental liberties without the existence of some compulsory
aspect to the program.").
90 Id at 586-87.
91 606 NYS2d at 267.
Although minors enjoy some constitutional protections that may limit the ability of
both parents and schools to control their education, this Comment does not address them.
Such protections include minors' privacy rights, which allow minors wide access to con-
traceptives and, in extremely specific circumstances, to abortion, both without parental
consent. See Carey v Population Services International, 431 US 678, 693 (1977) (contra-
ception); Bellotti v Baird, 443 US 622, 651 (1979) (plurality opinion) (abortion). One may
be tempted to use such rights as trump cards to resolve school condom-distribution con-
flicts, reasoning that if minors can have abortions without parental knowledge, they
should be able to receive condoms at schools without parental involvement.
Courts should resist this temptation. The important conflict in condom-distribution
cases involves the interests of the parents against the interests of the state, not the
parents' interests as against their children's. The balance of interests between parents
and children has very little impact on the question at issue: whether the state may
constitutionally supersede the liberty interest of parents. Parents clash with the state, not
their children, when they challenge school condom-distribution programs. They challenge
not that somewhere, somehow their children may obtain condoms, but that the school
itself provides them. Objecting to the latter does not directly implicate a minor's right to
contraception (assuming, for the sake of argument, that such a right exists) because
nonschool clinics and stores remain viable alternative sources. Hence, it is the power of
the state, not the rights of children, that merits attention.
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1. Parental challenges to sex education courses.
Most in-school condom-distribution programs take place in
conjunction with traditional sex education programs.93 Although
providing condoms is different from providing education, parental
challenges to traditional sex education courses have helped define
parents' rights to direct and control their children's education.
Although these challenges have arisen under the Free Exercise
Clause, rather than the Due Process Clause, they suggest some
general contours for the ability of parents to influence their
children's education under both clauses. Hence, the courts' analy-
ses of challenges to sex education courses shed light on how
courts might deal with possible attacks on school condom-distri-
bution programs. 4
Unfortunately, case law in this area is mixed and underde-
veloped. Two main themes, however, do emerge. One line of cases
suggests that the Free Exercise Clause requires parents to have
final authority over their children's attendance in sex education
classes.95 According to these cases, such classes cannot be man-
datory. Another line of cases, however, suggests that schools can
conduct mandatory sex education classes. These courts hold ei-
ther that exposing children to the content of such classes does
not burden parents' free exercise rights,9 or that the state's in-
terest justifies such a burden.97
The first line of cases suggests that the First Amendment
requires that parents make the ultimate decision whether or not
their children attend sex education classes. These cases either
reject programs lacking opt-out provisions9" or approve pro-
grams with excusal provisions.99 Hence, programs allowing par-
9 See, for example, Alfonso, 606 NYS2d at 261.
4 For other discussions of sex education, see Dutile, Sex, Schools and the Law at 47-
70 (cited in note 12); Comment, Sex Education: The Constitutional Limits of State Com-
pulsion, 43 S Cal L Rev 548, 565-67 (1970) (an example of the early debate surrounding
sex education courses); Sanders, Comment, 61 U Cin L Rev at 1481-88 (cited in note 62).
See, for example, Hobolth v Greenway, 52 Mich App 682, 218 NW2d 98, 99-100
(1974), Valent v New Jersey State Board of Education, 114 NJ Super 63, 274 A2d 832,
840-41 (Ct Ch Div 1971); Medeiros v Kiyosak, 52 Hawaii 436, 478 P2d 314, 317-18 (1970).
See, for example, Citizens for Parental Rights v San Mateo County Bd of Educ., 51
Cal App 3d 1, 124 Cal Rptr 68, 83 (1975).
See, for example, Davis v Page, 385 F Supp 395, 404 (D NH 1974).
See Hobolth, 218 NW2d at 100 (noting that trial court had ordered parental
involvement in the sex education program); Valent, 274 A2d at 839-41 (implying that
programs lacking excusal provisions are not the sole means of satisfying the state's
interest in providing sex education).
" See Medeiros, 478 P2d at 316; Citizens for Parental Rights, 124 Cal Rptr at 83.
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ents to make the final decision either do not burden free exercise
rights (and hence have no constitutional infirmities),"° or bur-
den them so slightly that they are justified.''
As illustrated above, most courts contemplate that the First
Amendment does require some type of parental involvement in
deciding whether or not children attend sex education classes.
Some courts, however, disagree. These courts find either that the
state's interest in a uniform curriculum justifies the intrusion
upon parental rights that accompanies compulsory atten-
dance, ' °2 or that mere exposure to the content of such courses is
insufficient to allege a free exercise claim.' °3
It is tempting to view condom-distribution programs as mere-
ly another aspect of these basic sex education courses and to
extend the courts' general sanction of the latter to the former.
Because of the distinction between providing information and
providing condoms, however, neither line of sex education prece-
dent satisfactorily applies to school condom programs.
In the sex education context, challenges to programs that
incorporate parental involvement uniformly fail. The direct appli-
cation of this precedent would render any condom-distribution
program that involved parents constitutional, regardless of the
form of that involvement. The application of this precedent, how-
ever, would not sufficiently address all of the issues surrounding
condom-distribution programs. Under the strict scrutiny that
such programs should trigger,'° they should be narrowly tai-
lored to meet the state's interest in preventing AIDS and preg-
nancy.' 5 This line of sex education cases, however, does not ad-
dress how different forms of parental involvement would impact
the analysis of the narrow-tailoring requirement. These cases
either find no burden on parents' rights (and hence do not inquire
'® Medeiros, 478 P2d at 317-18.
101 Citizens for Parental Rights, 124 Cal Rptr at 83 (noting that "even assuming an in-
fringement for the sake of argument, the incidental burden is justified by the compelling
state interest in education").
" See, for example, Davis, 385 F Supp at 404 (-'he state has a paramount and
recognized duty to provide for the health, welfare, and safety of its citizens. The health
course, which is secular in nature and purpose, is a proper means by which the state can
discharge this duty.").
10 Id ('iT~he most [the plaintiffs] have shown is that they find the health course to be
'distasteful.' This allegation without more does not invoke the broad mantle of protection
afforded by the First Amendment.").
' See text accompanying notes 126-45.
105 Rotunda and Nowak, 2 Treatise on Constitutional Law § 15.4 at 402 (cited in note
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into the state's interest),"6 or find a compelling interest but
skip the narrow-tailoring issue.0 7 For today's courts to analyze
correctly the constitutionality of school condom-distribution pro-
grams under strict scrutiny, they must determine whether such
programs are narrowly tailored-an analysis that entails an
examination of the differences between opt-out provisions and
prior-consent requirements.
The analysis of the courts allowing compulsory sex education
classes even absent parental involvement likewise fails to ad-
dress all the issues attendant to condom distribution. In these
cases, parental challenges to programs blocking their involve-
ment fail if courts either find mere exposure to distasteful ideas
insufficient to constitute a free exercise burden or find that this
burden is outweighed by the state's interest in uniformly educat-
ing all children about sexuality. Under this reasoning, parental
challenges to condom-distribution programs lacking parental
involvement would fail if courts viewed access to condoms the
same way they view exposure to information about sex. Because
the two are quite different, however, courts should find that
school condom-distribution programs do burden parental rights
and that this burden is not justified by the same interest that
justifies sex education courses. Courts should thus analyze con-
dom-distribution programs separately in order to determine if
other, noneducational interests may justify the burdens they
impose.
First, courts should recognize that condom-distribution pro-
grams, unlike mandatory sex education classes, burden parental
liberty interests. Unlike purely informational classes, condom-
distribution programs implicitly approve of, and may even en-
courage, sexual activity. Mandatory school attendance laws thus
force parents to send children into an environment that may
encourage disobedience, and this should be viewed as a burden.
The basic difference between the two types of programs is
that between providing factual information and facilitating ac-
tion. In the Establishment Clause context, for example, the Court
distinguishes between teaching students about religion and facili-
tating its exercise via school prayer or bible reading.0 8 The
:06 See, for example, Medeiros, 478 P2d at 317-18.
' See, for example, Citizens for Parental Rights, 124 Cal Rptr at 82-83 (recognizing a
"compelling state interest" in sex education but not analyzing the relation between the
program's structure and the state's interest).
" See, for example, School District of Abington Township v Schempp, 374 US 203,
222-24 (1963).
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Alfonso court recognized a similar distinction in the area of sex
education, noting that:
[Tihe condom availability component of respondents' distri-
bution program creates an entirely different situation. Stu-
dents are not just exposed to talk or literature on the subject
of sexual behavior; the school offers the means for students
to engage in sexual activity at a lower risk of pregnancy and
contracting sexually transmitted diseases."u
Providing condoms is unlike providing information about sex
because the former may lead students to infer approval of sexual
activity at a young age."0 Students (and parents) can perceive
condom-distribution programs as tacitly approving, and even
encouraging, sexual activity."'
Thus, the maxim that "mere exposure to distasteful ideas is
not a free exercise burden,"" perhaps plausible in the context
of sex education, is inapplicable to condom-distribution programs.
Parents challenging such programs do not merely object to the
fact that their children are exposed to distasteful ideas. Rather,
parents feel that the state's intrusion stems from its require-
ment, via compulsory school attendance laws, that they send
their children to an environment where the parens patriae en-
courages their children to disobey them. Hence, condom-distribu-
tion programs, unlike sex education classes, burden the rights of
parents because of the messages of approval and the actual facili-
tation that such programs entail.
" 606 NYS2d at 266. A similar distinction between ideas and acts was made in
Mozert v Hawkins County Board of Education, albeit in the free exercise context. 827 F2d
1058, 1065 (6th Cir 1987) ("The requirement that students read the assigned materi-
als ... in the absence of a showing that this participation entailed ... performance or
non-performance of a religious exercise.., does not place an unconstitutional burden on
the students' free exercise of religion.").
11 At a Montgomery County School Board meeting concerning the implementation of
a condom-distribution program, a seventeen-year-old individual told the board "that
distributing condoms takes authority away from parents and puts schools in a position of
condoning premarital sex... . 'Deep down, young people want to be led and shown what
is right,' he said to a standing ovation." Arlo Wagner, Condoms in health rooms decried,
Wash Times C6, C6 (June 29, 1994).
.. The Supreme Court has recognized that not only younger children but also teenag-
ers may have trouble differentiating between a school merely exposing them to an idea
and a school sanctioning that idea. This recognition underlies much of the Court's Estab-
lishment Clause jurisprudence. See, for example, Lee v Weisman, 505 US 577, 592 (1992)
("T]here are heightened concerns with protecting freedom of conscience from subtle co-
ercive pressure in the elementary and secondary public schools.").
11 See Davis, 385 F Supp at 404.
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Second, courts should find that the interest that justifies sex
education courses does not justify condom-distribution programs.
The two serve related, but markedly different, goals. Sex educa-
tion courses primarily aim to educate children about sex and
their bodies; the prevention of teen pregnancy, AIDS, and other
sexually transmitted diseases is a mere byproduct of this educa-
tion. Condom-distribution programs, by contrast, seek to serve
solely a preventive interest by providing the means for those who
are sexually active to be so safely.
Sex education serves the state's interest in uniformly educat-
ing all children about sexuality because it informs children about
changes occurring in their bodies and the new responsibilities
and opportunities these changes present. It is this educational
interest that justifies the burdens, if any, of sex education pro-
grams. Because the courts' approval of sex education is based on
the state's compelling educational interest, automatically extend-
ing this approval to condom programs ignores the fact that con-
dom programs serve no such educational interest. Instead, they
seek to serve the distinct interest of preventing AIDS and teen
pregnancy. Whether they further this interest, and whether that
interest justifies the attendant burden on parental liberty, re-
quires an analysis separate from that of sex education courses.
Thus, sex education precedent is inapposite to in-school con-
dom-distribution programs for two reasons. First, it ignores the
distinction between merely teaching children about sex and im-
plicitly encouraging and facilitating sexual activity. This encour-
agement and facilitation, unlike mere education, burdens the
liberty interests of parents who object to the programs, by creat-
ing an environment-into which the parents are forced by law to
send their children-that these parents feel is hostile to their
beliefs. Second, the justifications for any burdens inherent in
mandatory sex education programs fail to justify the burdens
placed on parental liberty by condom-distribution programs that
circumvent parental authority.
2. Parental challenges to the distribution of condoms to
minors in nonschool settings.
Though there is little dispute that nonschool public clinics
may distribute contraceptives to minors without parental notifi-
cation,"' the constitutional analysis of such distribution is differ-
3 Doe, 615 F2d at 1168-69. Even government attempts to require parental involve-
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ent than in the school clinic context. In Doe, for example, con-
cerned parents objected to this practice, alleging that condom
distribution by nonschool clinics violated their parental liberty
interests."4 The Sixth Circuit disagreed, holding that since
Michigan "imposed no compulsory requirements or prohibitions
which affect the rights of plaintiffs... [but] merely established a
voluntary birth control clinic," it had not interfered with the
parents' liberty interests."5 Since there was no interference
with parental constitutional rights, the court did not examine
whether the state interest was "compelling."" 6 This implied
that had the court found an interference with plaintiffs' parental
rights, it would have applied strict scrutiny to judge the constitu-
tionality of that interference." 7 Since the court found no in-
fringement, however, it did not apply any test at all.
If nonschool clinics may distribute condoms to minors who
seek them out, one might think school clinics should also have
the same ability. Indeed, as the Curtis court pointed out, children
are required to go to school but not to go to clinics within those
schools." 8  This reasoning, however, should not control the anal-
ysis. As the Alfonso court noted, the distinction between the
school itself and a school-based clinic is extremely tenuous."
ment in the nonschool clinic context have fared poorly. Case law suggests that the federal
government may not require federally funded family planning clinics to notify parents
when minor children seek birth control devices. In these cases, courts hold that notifica-
tion requirements would inhibit teens from seeking medical supervision of such services,
thus thwarting the congressional intent behind the establishment of such clinics. New
York v Schweiker, 557 F Supp 354, 361 (S D NY 1983); Planned Parenthood Federation of
America, Inc. v Schweiker, 559 F Supp 658, 668 (D DC), aff'd as Planned Parenthood
Federation of America v Heckler, 712 F2d 650 (DC Cir 1983). For more detailed treat-
ments of these cases, see Brenda D. Hofman, Note, The Squeal Rule: Statutory Resolution
and Constitutional Implications-Burdening the Minor's Right of Privacy, 1984 Duke L J
1325, 1332-37; Linda Himmelfarb, The 'Squeal Rule" Revisited, 51 Brooklyn L Rev 704
(1985). See also Boumil, 18 Seton Hall L Rev at 360-64 (cited in note 65).
114 615 F2d at 1166-67.
" Id at 1168 (distinguishing Pierce, Meyer, and Prince because "[i]n each of the
Supreme Court cases the state was either requiring or prohibiting some activity").
116 Id at 1169.
117 Id.
1 652 NE2d at 586.
"' The Alfonso court stated the point thus:
Parents must send their children to school .... This is the key distinction between
the situation these petitioners face and that faced by the parents who sued in Doe v.
Irwin. In Doe the plaintiffs were attempting to enjoin the distribution of contracep-
tive devices to their children at a public clinic. The clinic, however, was not inside a
school or other building where the parents were obliged by law to send their chil-
dren. Consequently, in Doe there was no State compulsion on parents to send their
children into an environment where they had unrestricted access to free contracep-
The University of Chicago Law Review
States intrude on parental liberty when schools distribute con-
doms because parents are required by law to send their children
to school and concurrently to cede some of their authority to
these schools. By contrast, minors who go to other public clinics
do so completely voluntarily, without the accompanying com-
pelled transfer of parental authority to the state. Parents object-
ing to school condom distribution do so because they are forced to
send their children to an antithetical environment where the
parens patriae encourages their children to obtain condoms, re-
gardless of the parents' desires.20 Indeed, proponents of school
programs cite the circumvention of parents as one justification
for such programs."
The voluntary nature of the school condom-distribution pro-
grams does not shield them from constitutional challenge, for the
parents' role remains involuntary.' Parents must still send
their children into an environment that they perceive as directly
contradicting what they attempt to teach at home, and implicitly
encouraging disobedience. This facilitating function, not the pos-
sibility that their children may receive condoms, is the burden.
Two other factors reinforce the notion that distribution in
school clinics, in contrast to nonschool clinics, burdens parental
rights. First, the state requires children to go to school in part so
that it may instill certain values in them," whereas it estab-
lishes public health clinics not to instill values but to provide
tives, which is precisely what the petitioners in the instant matter must do.
606 NYS2d at 266 (citation omitted).
120 Although wealthy parents could avoid this by sending their children to private
schools, most families cannot afford that option. Moreover, in this context, private
schooling is the equivalent of an opt-out provision, just a more expensive one.
121 For proponents of condom-distribution programs who expect parents to be either
hostile or indifferent to their children's sexual activity, see Pratt, Superintendent Balks,
Wash Post Md Weekly at 7 (cited in note 14) (quoting Jerry Shier, chairman of Montgom-
ery Medical Advisory Committee: "If we knew all parents would sit down, discuss and
support their children, it would be less of an issue to deal with it in the schools."); Ingfei
Chen, Condom Giveaway Starts in S.F., SF Chronicle A13 (May 5, 1992) (available in
LEXIS) (quoting seventeen-year-old student: "It should have been available a lot soon-
er .... A lot of these kids don't feel comfortable talking about it with their parents.");
Buckley, Sex Education's Tough Question, Wash Post at D3 (cited in note 12) (quoting
Eugene Sussman, chairman of Montgomery Medical Advisory Committee, arguing for the
programs because "a lot of parents don't know that their teenagers are sexually active and
are going from one partner to another").
2 See Alfonso, 606 NYS2d at 265-66 ("The minority points to the fact that student
participation... is wholly voluntary .... However, these factors do not constitute proof
that the petitioners are not being forced to surrender a parenting right.").
"2 See, for example, Amy Gutmann, Democratic Education 42-43 (Princeton 1987)
(describing how the critical function of schools is to instill democratic values in students).
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medical facilities to the poor. Schools target children as children;
public health clinics provide programs for people of all ages.
Hence, for children, activities in school carry with them a greater
implicit state sanction than activities carried on in other state
institutions. This purposeful indoctrination necessarily interferes
more with what parents teach at home than do similar messages
from voluntarily attended nonschool programs.' Finally, stu-
dents generally feel greater peer pressure at school than in any
other setting. Giving out condoms at school adds to this peer
pressure by insinuating that not only do their peers expect teens
to be sexually active, but so do their teachers.'25
Together, these factors demonstrate that, unlike their
nonschool counterparts, in-school condom-distribution programs
necessarily interfere with parental liberty rights. Thus, such
programs cannot be summarily validated under the Doe reason-
ing that noncompulsory state-sponsored activity does not infringe
parental rights.
III. A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING PARENTAL
LIBERTY AND SCHOOL CONDOM-DISTRIBUTION PROGRAMS
A. Parental Liberty and Strict Scrutiny
The Supreme Court has never explicitly stated that parental
liberty claims should be reviewed under the strict scrutiny of
modern due process analysis. 6 The trilogy of cases establishing
the parental liberty interest used the "reasonable relation" lan-
guage common to their era." 7 Later cases mixed free exercise
and parental liberty claims.2 In contrast, lower federal and
state courts have explicitly held the parental liberty interest to
be fundamental and deserving of strict scrutiny. To these courts,
12 One commentator notes that "[t]he atmosphere of the public school intensifies the
coercion of its teaching. Most governmental messages must compete with other messages
and can be ignored .... In public schools, however, not only must children listen to school
doctrine exclusively, but they also must learn and accept that doctrine." George W. Dent,
Jr., Religious Children, Secular Schools, 61 S Cal L Rev 864, 892 (1988).
" When schools convey such messages, it is not surprising that many teens feel that
"adult society fully expect[s] them to be sexually involved." Laurie Goodstein, Saying No
to Teen Sex in No Uncertain Terms, Wash Post Al, A4 (July 30, 1994) (quoting Richard
Ross, Youth Minister at Tulip Grove Baptist Church).
126 See Daniel J. Rose, Note, Compulsory Education and Parent Rights: A Judicial
Framework of Analysis, 30 BC L Rev 861, 880-81 (1989).
12 See text accompanying notes 16-29, 43.
See text accompanying notes 30-40, 44.
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however, the parental liberty interest includes only certain pa-
rental activity.'
Despite the Supreme Court's silence and the lower courts'
inconsistency, several factors suggest that influencing the sexual
decisions of one's child is part of the constitutionally protected
parental liberty interest and that infringements on this interest
warrant review under the tough standard of strict scrutiny. Un-
der the strict scrutiny standard, state infringements of a funda-
mental right must be "necessary" and "narrowly tailored" to meet
a compelling state interest. 3 '
The trilogy of cases that established the parental liberty
interest all explicitly grounded their holdings in the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause because they viewed parental
liberty as "essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men."'' Today, a select group of similar liberties, not men-
tioned in the Constitution but which protect "basic values 'implic-
it in the concept of ordered liberty,'"' 32 routinely merit the pro-
tection of strict scrutiny as fundamental rights under the doc-
trine of substantive due process." The right to marry, to trav-
el, and to vote are all examples of such "basic values" meriting
the protection of modern strict scrutiny." Because parental lib-
erty is likewise a basic value and an "enduring American tradi-
tion," '5 it should be deemed fundamental and accorded similar
protection. The Court's repeated acknowledgment of the impor-
tance of parental guidance suggests that it may be amenable to
" Compare Murphy v Arkansas, 852 F2d 1039, 1043 (8th Cir 1988) (refusing to apply
strict scrutiny analysis to a claim that parents could educate their children through home
schooling free of any state regulation whatsoever), with Doe, 615 F2d at 1167-69 (charac-
terizing parental liberty rights as fundamental and implying that strict scrutiny would be
applied if those rights were burdened).
"o Rotunda and Nowak, 2 Treatise on Constitutional Law § 15.4 at 402 (cited in note
9). Such infringements fit this definition only when there is no less restrictive alternative
available to the state. See also Ware v Valley Stream High School District, 75 NY2d 114,
551 NYS2d 167, 176 (1989) (noting that in strict scrutiny cases involving religious free
exercise, compelling state interests must be pursued "by the least restrictive means").
i" Meyer, 262 US at 399.
' Griswold v Connecticut, 381 US 479, 500 (1965) (Harlan concurring), quoting Palko
v Connecticut, 302 US 319, 325 (1937).
13 For judicial explorations of fundamental rights and substantive due process, see
Planned Parenthood v Casey, 505 US 833, 846-49 (1992); Bowers v Hardwick, 478 US 186,
190-96 (1986); Reno v Flores, 507 US 292, 302 (1993); Michael H. v Gerald D., 491 US
110, 122-23 (1989).
" Loving v Virginia, 388 US 1, 12 (1967) (right to marry); Shapiro v Thompson, 394
US 618, 629-31 (1969) (right to interstate travel); Harper v Virginia State Board of Elec-
tions, 383 US 663, 670 (1966) (right to vote).
1' Yoder, 406 US at 232.
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this argument.'36 Moreover, the Court frequently includes the
parental liberty interest in lists of rights protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment alongside rights the Court has explicitly
deemed fundamental,'37 suggesting that it sees little or no dif-
ference among these rights. Because the Court thus currently
seems to view these rights as equals, it should explicitly recog-
nize the parental liberty interest as fundamental. By doing so, it
would make express what its cases clearly imply: intrusions on
the parental liberty interest merit the strong protection of strict
scrutiny.
38
Further, the Supreme Court has enunciated certain "privacy"
rights as fundamental, thereby subjecting infringements on them
to strict scrutiny.'39 These privacy rights include basic familial
rights (for example, decisions regarding procreation, marriage,
and living arrangements) that are strikingly similar to parental
liberty interests. Although uncertainty exists as to whether pri-
vacy rights include parental rights or whether the two are relat-
ed but doctrinally separate,4 ° both are clearly grounded in the
Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed, the Court repeatedly cites Pierce
and Meyer in its privacy decisions, further suggesting that the
two rights enjoy similar constitutional protections.'
'" See note 46. See also Prince, 321 US at 166 ("It is cardinal with us that the custo-
dy, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and free-
dom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder."); Yoder,
406 US at 232 ("The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition
of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This primary role of
the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an
enduring American tradition.").
'" See, for example, Casey, 505 US at 851; Bellotti v Baird, 443 US 622, 637, 639 n 18
(1979) (plurality opinion); Roe v Wade, 410 US 113, 152-53 (1973); Moore v City of East
Cleveland, 431 US 494, 499 (1977).
'" See Rotunda and Nowak, 2 Treatise on Constitutional Law § 15.7 at 434-36 (cited
in note 9).
' See, for example, Roe, 410 US at 155; Carey v Population Services International,
431 US 678, 686 (1977).
' Compare Rose, Note, 30 BC L Rev at 881 (cited in note 126) (arguing that there is
little difference between privacy analysis and parental liberty), and Runyon v McCrary,
427 US 160, 178 n 15 (1976) ("The Meyer-Pierce-Yoder 'parental right' and the privacy
right... may be no more than verbal variations of a single constitutional right."), with
Francis Barry McCarthy, The Confused Constitutional Status and Meaning of Parental
Rights, 22 Ga L Rev 975, 985-1006 (1988) (exploring various characterizations of parental
rights), and Anne C. Dailey, Constitutional Privacy and the Just Family, 67 Tulane L Rev
955, 986 (1993) ("Parental rights are not simply a modified version of the individual right
of privacy.").
' See, for example, Roe, 410 US at 152-53 (in dictum, treating family relationships
and child rearing as fundamental rights); Griswold, 381 US at 483 (reaffirming "the
principle of the Pierce and the Meyer cases").
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Last, influence over the sexual decisions of one's child resem-
bles other parental activities that lower courts have included in
the parental liberty interest-activities that states' attempts to
usurp warrant strict scrutiny. Generally, parental activities that
would either completely exclude the state from some aspect of
their children's education or give parents ultimate control over
all aspects of traditional public school curricula are not part of
the protected interest." Conversely, activities that allow par-
ents to remain involved when the state assumes responsibilities
traditionally left to the family will be included in the liberty
interest.' Hence, these courts apply strict scrutiny to some,
but not all, state regulations impeding parental activities.
Courts should view parental consent mechanisms in school
condom programs as falling within the second category of activi-
ties and, therefore, as protected by the parental liberty interest.
Parents asking for such involvement when schools distribute
condoms do not seek to block the state from exerting any influ-
ence over a child's sexual decisions by, for example, contesting
sex education classes or condom distribution at other clinics. Nor
do they seek control over all aspects of traditional school curricu-
la, for such active school involvement in children's sex lives is a
relatively recent phenomenon.' Instead, they ask merely that
the state share authority in one very slim area-whether or not
their children may obtain condoms at school. Indeed, lower courts
14 See People v Bennett, 442 Mich 316, 501 NW2d 106, 111-12 (1993) (refusing to cast
as fundamental the right to home school one's child completely free of any state regula-
tion whatsoever); Herndon v Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Board of Education, 899 F Supp
1443, 1450-51 (M D NC 1995) (holding that parents have no findamental right "to exert
pre-emptive control over the curriculum of public schools" in the context of challenges to a
community service requirement). Courts base such exclusions on overly narrow readings
of Pierce and Yoder. By focusing solely on the religious aspects of the two cases, courts
conclude (wrongly) that only parental objections with religious components merit strict
scrutiny. See Bennett, 501 NW2d at 111-13; Herndon, 899 F Supp at 1450-51. As this
Comment demonstrates in Section I, however, the Pierce Court never mentioned free
exercise rights, and the Yoder Court did not foreclose the application of strict scrutiny to
secular parental objections via the Fourteenth Amendment. See text accompanying notes
36-40.
143 See, for example, Michael v Hertzler, 900 P2d 1144, 1145 (Wyo 1995) (holding
parents' right to determine who visits their child to be fundamental).
14 What is key here is that the school involvement in this new area can likely contra-
dict traditional parental teachings in that area. The community service programs in
Herndon, 899 F Supp at 1443, should thus be viewed as "traditional." Schools have long
emphasized the importance of volunteering and giving, and such emphasis is unlikely to
undermine parental attempts to influence their children in a sensitive and private area.
Community-mindedness is a far cry from sexual activity.
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have applied a strict scrutiny-type analysis to such pro-
grams.
45
Because of its Fourteenth Amendment grounding and its
similarity to privacy rights and religious free exercise rights,
parental liberty merits the strong protection of strict scrutiny.
This liberty should include actions by parents by which they
merely seek to share with the state control over their children's
sexual development. School condom programs thus merit review
under a strict scrutiny standard.
B. Prior-Consent Requirements, Opt-Out Provisions, and Par-
ents' Rights
As demonstrated above, school condom-distribution pro-
grams, in contrast to nonschool clinic programs, necessarily im-
pair parents' Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests, thus trig-
gering strict scrutiny review.' Only prior-consent require-
ments, and not opt-out provisions, can withstand such scrutiny.
Strict scrutiny requires that a program not only involve a com-
pelling state interest but also that it be "necessary" and "narrow-
ly tailored"--that is, the least restrictive means possible-to meet
that interest.147 In the specific context of condom distribution in
public schools, the question thus becomes: What method of dis-
tributing condoms to minors to further the state's compelling
interest in combating AIDS' 8 is least restrictive of parents'
Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests? This Section demon-
strates that while programs that require prior consent and pro-
grams containing opt-out provisions both pursue the state's com-
1 See, for example, Alfonso, 606 NYS2d at 266.
See text accompanying notes 139-45.
147 Rotunda and Nowak, 2 Treatise on Constitutional Law § 15.4 at 402 (cited in note
9). Although not every statement of the strict scrutiny test explicitly states that the "least
restrictive means" possible is required, this is in effect what courts look for when they ask
whether an intrusion is narrowly tailored. That courts use different rhetoric does not
change the substance of the test. See Craig R. Ducat and Harold W. Chase, Constitutional
Interpretation 94 (West 5th ed 1992). See also Ware v Valley Stream High School District,
75 NY2d 114, 551 NYS2d 167, 176 (1989) (noting that in cases involving religious free
exercise, compelling state interests must be pursued "by the least restrictive means");
Rose, Note, 30 BC L Rev at 897, 883 (cited in note 126) (arguing that "parents' rights to
guide the education of their children" are fundamental rights deserving strict scrutiny and
that "[under such an analysis, a state may not impinge on such a right unless the action
it is taking is the least restrictive alternative to achieving a compelling state interest").
" There is no doubt that preventing AIDS is a compelling state interest. See Alfonso,
606 NYS2d at 266. Accordingly, this Comment focuses on the latter part of the strict scru-
tiny test, the means used to meet that interest.
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pelling interest in preventing AIDS, the former are the least re-
strictive means to that end.
Because the burden posed by opt-out clauses is inherently
greater than that of prior-consent requirements, opt-out clauses
fail to meet the "least restrictive means" portion of the strict
scrutiny standard. Opt-out provisions force concerned parents to
act affirmatively to regain their natural legal authority. In con-
trast, consent requirements leave this authority with the parents
until they knowingly and voluntarily delegate it to school offi-
cials.'49
Legislatures and courts have recognized the strong "principle
of express prior consent" in other areas. 5 ' For example, in the
school context, officials must obtain parental consent before per-
forming even routine medical services such as providing aspirin
and before including children in certain activities such as field
trips and contact sports.'5' Consent, then, is required in special
situations'52 so that parents knowingly and voluntarily cede
their authority to the school.
' Parents challenging school condom-distribution programs as violating their right to
consent to medical services recognized this distinction, explaining that:
The requirements of prior parental consent (opt-in) and parental veto (opt-out) are
functionally and procedurally different. Parental consent is more stringent, more
protective of the rights at stake because it requires the entity seeking consent to wait
until consent is affirmatively given. For example, if a parent does not act, consent is
not given. Opt-out, on the other hand, allows the entity seeking approval to proceed
until the parent actually vetoes their child's participation. For example, if a parent
does not act, consent is assumed.
Parents United for Better Schools, Inc. v School Dist. of Philadelphia Bd of Educ., 166 Pa
Commw 462, 646 A2d 689, 691 (1994).
" See, for example, id at 692 (holding that the common law right of parents to con-
sent to the provision of medical services gives parents standing to challenge condom-
distribution program opt-out provisions as violating that right). Legislatures often im-
plicitly recognize this distinction. For example, in Pennsylvania, minors must secure con-
sent before getting tattoos, donating blood, driving a car, getting a marriage license, or
waiving their Miranda rights. Id.
"' See, for example, William D. Valente, 2 Education Law: Public and Private § 19.23
at 212 (West 1985) (acknowledging "It]he common school practice of obtaining written
parental consents or waivers.., for designated [school] (e.g. field trips) activities"); Cal
Educ Code Ann § 49302 (West 1993) (requiring parental consent before pupils can be
transported).
152 Virginia Governor George Allen considers the mere provision of sex education
courses such a special situation. Thus, he has proposed replacing Virginia's current opt-
out provisions with prior parental-consent requirements. Virginia parents perceive a dis-
tinction between the two types of parental liberty safeguards. One parent explained, "[ilt
ought to be something that parents choose, rather than having to feel obligated to pull out
of." Michael D. Shear, Some Parents Back Plan on Sex-Ed, Wash Post Va Weekly 1, 7
(Dec 8, 1994).
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Given that prior-consent requirements are less burdensome
than opt-out clauses, the question whether programs entailing
the former adequately further the state's interest in preventing
AIDS remains to be addressed. As demonstrated in the following
example, programs with prior-consent requirements do in fact
serve that end as well as programs with opt-out clauses.
To illustrate the difference between the two programs, imag-
ine a high school with one thousand students. Five hundred sets
of parents would consent to condom distribution to their teenag-
ers, three hundred would not, and two hundred are indifferent.
Imagine that the eight hundred sets of parents with definite
opinions took whatever action the state required, by either sign-
ing a consent form or an opt-out form to evidence their desires.
The indifferent two hundred, however, do nothing under either
regime.
In a program with prior-consent requirements, only five
hundred students receive condoms. However, the school has not
infringed on the parental rights of those five hundred sets of
parents giving their consent. These parents are no worse off than
before the program's implementation. They merely voluntarily
delegated some authority to the state. Nor does this program
burden the rights of the three hundred sets of nonconsenting
parents, since these parents are not required to act affirmatively
to maintain their authority.
In a program with an opt-out provision, seven hundred stu-
dents receive condoms. Note, however, that the three hundred
sets of nonconsenting parents were forced to act affirmatively to
assert their rights, since the presumption of responsibility is
shifted from the parents to the state.
Thus, the debate boils down to the extent of the state's inter-
est in providing condoms to the students of the indifferent par-
ents: In order to reach those two hundred students, is the state's
interest strong enough to justify the burdens on the three hun-
dred sets of concerned parents? Several factors suggest that the
effect of prior-consent programs on the children of the indifferent
parents would be minimal. This also suggests that the more in-
trusive opt-out programs might not be necessary to achieve the
state's goal.'53
" Many of these arguments are also made by commentators examining the more
general question whether schools must involve parents at all. See Boumil, 18 Seton Hall L
Rev at 374-77 (cited in note 65). Boumil argues, for example, that clinics dispensing
contraceptives without parental notification violate the parents' rights (a) by enabling
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First, the state may still teach about condoms in sex educa-
tion classes and distribute them at nonschool public health clin-
ics."M One anecdotal account reported eight such clinics within
a fourteen-block radius of one urban public high school.'55
Moreover, students may purchase condoms cheaply at any drug
store. Second, evidence does not support the effectiveness of
school condom-distribution programs in reducing pregnancy and
AIDS, 55 and it has been pointed out that availability is not de-
terminative of contraceptive use.5 7 Third, the threat of AIDS is
not so great as to give the state carte blanche to intrude on pa-
rental liberty. Analogous risks have not justified unlimited intru-
sion upon similar rights.'58 Fourth, underage consensual sex is
still illegal in most states.'59 Implicitly encouraging children to
do what a state has statutorily disapproved of seems to under-
mine the state's interest. In effect, the state is saying that its
interest is having teens break laws safely.6 ' Finally, the lack of
concern of these indifferent parents does not necessitate a burden
on those parents who do care.'' That is, the lack of interest of
minors to circumvent parental involvement; (b) by depriving parents of the chance to add
to, influence, or counteract the clinic's advice; and (c) by encouraging some parents to
avoid educating their children about sex as that task will be seen as the state's responsi-
bility. Id at 375.
:54 See Section II.B.2.
Douglas J. Besharov and Karen N. Gardiner, Teen Sex: truth and consequences,
Orlando Sentinel G1, G5 (Feb 21, 1993).
'" Kay Coles James, Clinton's 'condom CEO' nomination, Wash Times G3, G3 (July
14, 1993) (reporting that "[aiccording to Douglas Kirby, consultant for the National Center
for Population Options, an organization that promotes [school-based clinics], the clinics
reportedly 'had no measurable impact on teen pregnancy rates'").
" Besharov and Gardiner report that "an objective look at the data reveals that
availability is not the prime factor in determining contraceptive use. Almost all young
people have access to at least one form of contraception." Besharov and Gardiner, Teen
Sex, Orlando Sentinel at G5 (cited in note 155) (basing conclusions on 1979 survey by
Johns Hopkins School of Hygiene and Public Health that found that more than 75 percent
of children between the ages of fifteen and nineteen had received sex education and that
75 percent of those children "remember[ed] being told how to obtain contraception").
"5 Ware, 551 NYS2d at 176 (noting that "[a]s with other grave risks we have faced
during the past two centuries, the threat of AIDS cannot summarily obliterate this
Nation's fundamental values").
" See, for example, Ala Code § 13A-6-20 (1995); Cal Penal Code Ann § 261.5 (West
1988 & Supp 1996); Idaho Code § 18-1508 (1987 & Supp 1995); Mass Ann Laws ch 265, §
13B (Law Co-op 1992); W Va Code § 61-8B-5 (1992).
'" Columnist Mona Charen has noted this ironic twist, writing that '[wle do not take
that attitude toward drugs. If we did, there would be clean needle-distribution programs
in the public schools. Instead, we do everything possible to 'scare kids straight' about
drugs." Mona Charen, Sex, Lies, And Liberals: N.Y. Curriculum Clash, St. Louis Dispatch
3C, 3C (Mar 4, 1993).
'61 To the contrary, the state may have an interest in actively engaging these disinter-
ested parents. One scholar has suggested that children are best served when power over
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some parents (whether a minority or a majority) in their liberty
interests does not justify state intrusion upon those interests for
all parents. The state's interest in providing condoms to those
students whose parents are indifferent is, thus, insufficient to
justify the intrusion on the liberty interests of the parents object-
ing to their children's receipt of condoms.
Only one state interest thus justifies school distribution pro-
grams: the state's interest in facilitating condom use by students
whose parents have actively consented to such facilitation by the
school, while at the same time not facilitating condom use by
students whose parents object. To this end, prior-consent require-
ments best assure that what seems like consent really is consent.
Substantively, prior-consent requirements better assure that
consent is the product of open and honest discussion. Such re-
quirements mean that consent comes only after parents have
actually considered the issue; with opt-out provisions, consent
can be found where the topic has been avoided. Such discussions
and requirements thus assure that the state exerts its influence,
in this specific context, only where truly welcomed by parents.
The state will then cross no constitutional boundaries.
Prior consent requirements thus provide the least restrictive
means for the state to meet its interest in AIDS and pregnancy
prevention. The inherent presumption of opt-out provisions-that
silence means consent-is not only unnecessary to meet the
state's interest, but is also more intrusive than the alternative.
For this reason, schools that wish to distribute condoms constitu-
tionally should require prior parental consent.
CONCLUSION
When schools distribute condoms, they risk burdening a long
recognized "parental liberty" interest-the Fourteenth Amend-
ment right to direct the upbringing of one's child. Unlike sex
education courses and nonschool condom-distribution programs,
distributing condoms at public schools necessarily burdens paren-
tal liberty interests. Because these interests are rooted in the
them is distributed among parents and the state. Under this rationale, "some matters,
most notably those concerning health and education, are too important to the well-being
of children and society to be entrusted exclusively to any single entity, the family includ-
ed." Ira C. Lupu, The Separation of Powers and the Protection of Children, 61 U Chi L Rev
1317, 1320 (1994). Decisions concerning contraception surely count as one such matter;
hence the state should attempt to involve the family in contraceptive decisions. Requiring
parental involvement in school condom-distribution programs would ensure that the state
did not have a monopoly in that area.
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fundamental liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, they should be reviewed under the strict
scrutiny standard used for modern Due Process Clause claims.
Among other things, strict scrutiny requires school condom-distri-
bution programs to be necessary and narrowly tailored-that is,
the least restrictive means possible-to meet the state's interest
in preventing AIDS.
Only school condom-distribution programs that require prior
parental consent survive this scrutiny. Merely allowing concerned
parents to opt out of such programs is insufficient. While opt-out
provisions recognize the importance of parental influence, only
prior-consent requirements are the least restrictive means of
achieving the state's interest in AIDS prevention. In contrast to
opt-out provisions, prior-consent requirements respect parental
authority as controlling until parents voluntarily delegate it to
the state. Hence, the state enters the parental domain only when
invited-and the Constitution itself requires this invitation.
